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Causes and Consequences 
Stephanie R. Aaronson 
Young men today are significantly worse off than 
their counterparts who entered the labor market in the 
late 1960s. Starting wages for young men declined by 
nearly 10 percent between the late 1960s and late 
1980s. Even college graduates experienced some 
decline in starting wages. 1 More importantly, the 
evidence suggests that most workers did not make up 
for the lost starting wages with higher wage growth. On 
average, young men entering the labor market during 
the late 1970s and 1980s experienced 15-20 percent 
less wage growth over the first 10 years of their careers 
than did young men who started working in the late 
1960s. Furthermore, this overall decline was 
accompanied by other changes in the distribution of 
wage growth that appear to have exacerbated lifetime 
inequality between young men with different levels of 
education. Among cohorts that started working in the 
late 1960s, workers with a high school education or less 
experienced 68 percent wage growth over their first 10 
years, while college graduates experienced 44 percent 
wage growth, indicating that returns to experience 
ameliorated inequality in starting wages among early 
cohorts. By the early 1980s, however, wage growth 
among college graduates had increased to between 50 
and 60 percent, while wage growth among those with a 
high school degree or less had declined to between 40 
and 45 percent. Thus, among more recent cohorts, 
changes in the returns to experience reinforce wage 
disparities across education groups. 
The decline in wage growth among young men has 
important repercussions. Wage growth is one of the 
primary determinants of lifetime income, and thus these 
trends have the potential to impact life cycle decisions 
such as educational attainment, marriage, and home 
ownership. Moreover, lifetime earnings inequality 
reflects permanent differences in access to resources 
across individuals. Analysis of cross-sectional 
earnings, the focus of many recent studies, cannot 
provide information on this topic; in any given year, the 
distribution of wages may be largely driven by 
transitory shocks. Thus, by focusing on the structure of 
wage levels in the cross section, previous studies have 
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ignored an important economic trend of the last 30 
years. Because wage growth (either by itself or 
through its impact on lifetime earnings) affects so 
many individual consumption and investment 
decisions, understanding these trends is particularly 
important for public policy. Many public programs-
ranging from the Earned Income Tax Credit to job 
placement services-focus on increasing employment 
and CUlTent earnings, while ignoring long-term 
considerations such as job mobility and wage growth. 
In doing so, these programs neglect an important 
incentive for individual behavior. 
My dissertation documents the trends in wage 
growth and explores the implications of the observed 
changes, as well as possible factors that have 
contributed to the trends. The first chapter examines 
whether the decline in employment among low-skilled 
young men since the late 1960s can be explained by the 
decline in wage growth, which has reduced the value of 
work considerably. The second chapter details the 
increases in lifetime earnings inequality over the past 
30 years and shows that they have been at least as great 
as the much more widely studied increases in cross-
sectional inequality. Finally, the third chapter 
investigates the extent to which skill-biased technical 
change has been responsible for the observed changes 
in the structure of wage growth. 
CHAPTERl 
LOOKING AHEAD: YOUNG MEN, WAGE 
GROWTH, AND LABOR SUPPLY 
The first chapter examines whether the changes in 
wage growth described above can explain the decline in 
employment among young men that has OCCUlTed over 
the past 30 years. Much attention has been paid to the 
salubrious effects of the CUlTent economic expansion 
on the employment of young men (for example, 
Freeman and Rodgers 1999). However, the present rate 
of employment among young men still lags far behind 
those attained during the late 1960s. Annual 
participation (defined as the proportion of high school 
dropouts with one to five years of experience who 
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worked at least one week in a given year) declined 17 
percent between 1967 and 1997, and annual 
participation among high school graduates declined 5 
percent. While past studies have attributed the drop to 
declining wage levels or increases in unearned income 
(e.g., Juhn 1992), this paper argues that young men are 
forward-looking and take into consideration the 
opportunity for future wage growth as well as current 
wage levels in making their labor market choices. 
Thus, the large decline in wage growth among low-skill 
young men over the past 30 years is an overlooked 
explanation for the downward trend in employment. 
Distinguishing between the effects of changing 
wage levels and changing wage growth is important. 
The decline in participation represents a large loss in 
productive capacity, and considerable resources are 
allocated toward increasing the labor market 
participation of young people through such 
mechanisms as training programs and the Earned 
Income Tax Credit. While these programs try to 
improve wage levels, they often fail to take wage 
growth into consideration and, as a result, neglect an 
important work incentive. 
The traditional static model of labor supply is 
based on the assumption that the current wage level is a 
sufficient statistic for the value of employment. This 
model ignores the fact that employment also provides 
work experience and concomitant wage growth. For 
young people, wage growth is particularly high and, 
because they have a long time to benefit, returns to 
experience are likely to comprise a large part of the 
value of current employment. As wage growth 
changes, so too does the value of employment. A 
simple two-period model of labor with endogenous 
wages elucidates the way in which the labor supply 
decisions of young workers depend on wage growth. In 
the model, individuals maximize utility with respect to 
consumption and hours of work in each period. The 
wages of older workers (in the second period) are a 
function of hours worked when young (the first period) 
and an exogenous wage growth parameter.2 Although 
the equation for labor supply does not have a closed 
form solution, I demonstrate that when the substitution 
effect is greater than the income and intertemporal 
substitution effects, an increase in wage growth induces 
more work among the young. 3 
Whether a change in wage growth actually affects 
employment is ultimately an empirical question. Thus, 
the next step is to estimate a model of labor supply in 
which individuals take into consideration wage growth 
as well as wage levels. Cohorts are defined by year of 
entry into the labor market following the completion of 
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schooling. There are four education groups: high 
school dropouts, high school graduates, those with 
some college, and college graduates. The estimation is 
performed at the cohort level using artificial cohorts of 
young men from the CPS.4 Due to sampling error, the 
cohort means obtained from the CPS are only error-
ridden measures of the true cohort means. Therefore, 
an error-in-variables approach is used (Browning, 
Deaton, and Irish 1985; Deaton 1985). The resulting 
cohort-level error terms are heteroskedastic, a problem 
for which we correct. Two equations are estimated, an 
annual participation equation and an equation of hours 
of work conditional on positive participation. 
The results show that indeed young men are 
forward-looking in their labor supply decisions. A 10 
percent increase in the return to experience increases 
the annual participation rate by 0.6 percentage point 
and annual hours conditional on positive employment 
by 24 hours. As a point of comparison, a 10 percent 
increase in hourly wages increases the annual 
participation rate by 0.7 percentage point and annual 
hours by 28 hours a year. Thus we see that expected 
wage growth plays an important part in the labor supply 
decision. Moreover, our model is able to predict 40 
percent of the fall in annual participation among high 
school dropouts between 1967 and 1977, a period of 
decline that previous studies have had difficulty 
explaining. In fact, if we hold wage growth constant at 
the 1967 level but allow wages and the remaining 
variables to vary, then we would actually expect to see a 
slight increase in participation over this period, 
suggesting that the decline in wage growth accounts for 
all of the explained decline in participation. 
As noted, the estimation described above assumes 
that individuals have perfect foresight (or at least an 
unbiased estimate) of their average cohort/education 
group wage growth. This assumption was tested by 
reestimating the model with several alternative 
measures of expected wage growth. These include the 
five-year lag of five-year wage growth (which is akin to 
assuming that individuals take as their expected wage 
growth the actual wage growth of similar individuals 
five years ahead of them in the labor market); lO-year 
cross-sectional wage growth (which represents the case 
in which individuals expect to have the same wages in 
10 years as similar individuals with 10 years more 
experience at a given point in time); and actual wage 
growth instrumented with cross-sectional wage growth 
(which captures the intuition that people combine some 
information about their own actual wage growth with 
information available in the cross section). This last 
measure performs the best. A 10 percent increase in 
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expected wage growth increases annual participation by 
2.3 percentage points and annual hours of work by (a 
statistically insignificant) 23 hours. Thus, it seems that 
young men do take into consideration some expectation 
of their ex post wage growth. 
This work makes several contributions to the 
existing literature. First, it demonstrates empirically 
the importance of forward-looking considerations in 
the labor supply decisions of young men. Although this 
issue has received considerable theoretical attention, it 
is not often considered in applied research or public 
policy. This suggests that policies aimed at increasing 
the labor market participation of young workers, either 
through training or the tax system, should take wage 
growth into consideration. Second, the study 
demonstrates that changes in wage growth are a key to 
understanding changes in employment over time, 
particularly among low-skilled young men. Past 
studies, including that of Juhn (1992), have had 
difficulty explaining the decline in labor market 
participation during the 1970s and attributed it to a shift 
in the labor supply curve. The results presented here 
indicate that a large part of that shift can be explained 
by changes in wage growth. There is also another 
possible interpretation. Traditional labor supply 
analysis plots participation against the wage. If instead 
we plot participation against the present discounted 
value of employment, then we can see the decline in 
labor market activity over the 1970s as a movement 
along this newly defined labor supply curve. 
CHAPTER 2 
LIFETIME INEQUALITY IS INCREASING TOO 
The second chapter was prompted by the 
possibility that the changing structure of wage growth 
may have led to a decrease in lifetime earnings and an 
increase in lifetime earnings inequality. While a vast 
literature has explored the change in cross-sectional 
earnings inequality, fewer studies have examined 
changes in lifetime earnings inequality.5 However, 
lifetime earnings are a better measure of individual 
access to resources, and lifetime earnings inequality is 
a better measure of the disparity in access. This chapter 
thus begins to fill a significant gap in our understanding 
of how the economic well-being of young men has 
evolved over the past 30 years. 
We begin by analyzing the decline in lifetime 
earnings. Ten-year earnings, measured as the sum of 
earnings over the first 10 years of work, declined 
monotonically throughout the 30-year period.6 
Cohorts that entered the labor market between 1967 
and 1970 earned $270,770 over the first 10 years of 
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their career. In contrast, those entering the labor market 
in 1987 and 1988 earned $233,080-a loss of 14 
percent, or $37,690. Of course, not all young men had 
the same experience. High school dropouts 
experienced a 33 percent decline in earnings, while 
those with a college degree experienced almost no 
decline. For all workers, declines in hourly wages 
explain the majority of the loss of earnings, but for 
workers with a high school degree or less, reductions in 
hours of work also playa significant role, explaining at 
least 70 percent of the decline in earnings during the 
1970s and 20 percent of the decline during the 1980s. 
The disparity in losses for workers with different 
levels of education suggests that this overall decline in 
lifetime earnings has been accompanied by an increase 
in lifetime earnings inequality. An examination of the 
lO-year skill premium shows this to be the case. For 
instance, we find that whereas college graduates 
entering the labor market in the late 1960s earned 2.6 
times as much as their high school dropout compatriots 
over the first 10 years of their career, those entering the 
labor market in the late 1980s eamed 3.7 times as much 
as the drop-outs over 10 years. The college graduate/ 
high school graduate lifetime earnings premium rose 
from 1.57 to 2.0 over the same time period. These 
increases in the lifetime earnings premium are greater 
than the corresponding increases in the cross-sectional 
earnings premium over the same time period. 
Although the lifetime skill-premium can tell us on 
average how groups are doing relative to one another, it 
does not tell us what has happened overall to the 
dispersion of earnings or the dispersion of eamings 
within education groups. To answer these questions we 
focus on a measure of inequality which is common in 
the lifetime inequality literature: the coefficient of 
variation (cf. Gittleman and Joyce 1996; Lillard 1977; 
Parsons 1978).7 In order to calculate the coefficient of 
variation, I use matched panels of the CPS, which track 
individuals over a period of two years.8 The lO-year 
coefficient of variation rose 30 percent, from 0.39 for 
cohorts entering the labor market in the late 1960s to 
approximately 0.52 for those starting to work in the 
1980s. This rise in inequality is due to increases in 
inequality both within and between education groups. 
The increase in inequality within education groups was 
in the range of 34-46 percent. It was highest for those 
with a high school degree or some college education 
and lower for high school dropouts and college 
graduates. To put these trends in perspective, I 
compare them with the changes in the coefficient of 
variation of cross-sectional eamings for those with 
1-10 years of experience. I find that the coefficient of 
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variation of lO-year earnings rose faster than the cross-
sectional coefficient of variation, indicating that the 
increases in cross-sectional inequality noted in previous 
studies are not being offset over the life cycle, but 
rather that a portion of the increase in cross-sectional 
inequality is persistent.9 
It is also interesting to note that despite the large 
decline in hours of work among low-skilled young 
men, the increase in earnings inequality largely due to 
an increase in the variance of wages. The coefficient of 
variation of hourly wages increased by 25 percent on 
average from the mid 1970s to the early 1980s. Young 
men with low levels of education saw the largest 
increases in the wage inequality. Overall, there has 
been essentially no change in overall inequality of 
annual hours. Within education groups, the changes 
have also been small, on the order of 3-10 percent. 
Furthermore, these changes do not suggest a strong 
trend. 
In summary, young men with a high school 
education or less who entered the labor market during 
the 1980s earned significantly less over the first 10 
years of their careers than did cohorts that started 
working in the late 1960s. They are also worse off 
relative to their contemporaries with higher levels of 
education. The findings suggest that the increase in 
inequality observed in the cross section is not being 
offset by increased mobility over the life cycle and thus 
may require policy attention if it is to be ameliorated. 
CHAPTER 3 
1ECHNOLOGY, DEMOGRAPHY, AND 
WAGE GROWTH 
In this chapter, we explore possible explanations 
for the observed trends in wage growth over the past 30 
years. We focus on two likely candidates: the changing 
relative supply of old and young, high- and low-skilled 
workers, which has resulted from the baby boom, and 
increased educational attainment and skill-biased 
technical change. Since the 1960s, the U.S. labor force 
has undergone dramatic changes. Between 1966 and 
1981, the number of young men with one to five years 
of work experience increased over 70 percent, from 
slightly more than 13 million to nearly 23 million. 
Moreover, these new workers were the most highly 
educated in our nation's history. The number of young 
people with a college degree increased by nearly 250 
percent between 1966 and 1976.10 Numerous studies 
at the time explored the impact of the large size and 
high education level of the baby-boom cohorts on the 
economic well-being of its members, and evidence 
from these studies suggests that the large size of the 
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baby boom generation did depress the wage levels of 
the members. However, no effort has been made to 
follow up that work and determine how their wage 
growth was affected. The U.S. economy has also 
experienced technological advances that may have 
affected wage growth over time. If the bias of technical 
change has differed for old and young workers, then 
wage growth may have been affected as well. 11 
To disentangle these possible stories, a translog 
aggregate production function was estimated in which 
old and young, high- and low-skill workers are treated 
as separate inputs. 12 The production function also 
allows for the possibility of skill-biased technical 
change. Using the parameters estimated from this 
model, we quantify the contribution of changes in the 
size and composition of the labor force and changes in 
technology to the trends in wage growth. 13 
The results of the estimation are generally as 
would be expected: all the own elasticities are negative. 
Although no studies dis aggregate workers by both 
experience and education, previous studies did 
aggregate workers by either age or education. For the 
most part, our elasticities have the same sign as earlier 
estimates and are of comparable magnitude. The data 
clearly reject the hypothesis of Hicks neutral technical 
change. The conventional wisdom is that there has 
been skill-biased technical change in favor of high-
skilled workers. Our data tell a somewhat more 
complicated story. While there has been technical 
change away from low-skilled workers, it has been born 
entirely by older workers. The measure of skill-biased 
technical change for low-skilled young workers is small 
and statistically insignificant. Interestingly, there is no 
evidence of skill-biased technical change toward older 
high-skilled workers, while there has been a small but 
statistically significant technical shift away from high-
skilled young workers. 
Finally, we use the estimated parameters to 
decompose the changes in wage growth (Table 1). 
Low-skilled workers entering the labor market in 1979 
experienced a 14 percentage point decrease in wage 
growth relative to the 1969 cohort, while the more 
recent cohort of high-skilled workers experienced an 8 
percentage point increase in wage growth relative to the 
earlier cohort. Our model predicts an 11 percentage 
point decline in wage growth for low-skilled workers 
and a 5 percentage point increase in wage growth for 
high-skilled workers. Turning to the details, we find 
that for low-skilled workers, technical change was the 
driving force behind observed patterns of wage growth, 
accounting for a 50 percentage point decline in wage 
growth ceteris paribus. The reason is that technical 
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Table 1 Decomposition of the Change in Wage Growth between the Cohort with 1-5 Years of Experience in 
1969 and the Cohort with 1-5 Years of Experience in 1979 
Low-skill High-skill 
Total Total 
Old Young eOLj89*dlnXj89)- Old Young (eOHj89*dlnXj89)-
(eOLj89*dlnXi89) (eYLj79*dlnXj79) (eYLj79 *dlnXj79) (eOHj89*dlnXj89 ) (eYHj79 * dlnXj79) (eYHj79*dlnXj79) 
1) Own-effect -0.15 -0.13 -0.02 --0.07 --0.17 0.10 
2) Technical --0.57 --0.07 -0.50 --0.12 --0.72 0.61 
change effect 
3) Capital effect 0.99 1.25 -0.26 --0.09 0.95 -1.04 
4) Cross-effect -0.39 -1.06 0.67 0.21 --0.17 0.38 
5) Total predicted -0.11 --0.01 --0.11 --0.07 --0.12 0.05 
wage growth 
6) Actual wage --0.14 0.08 
growth 
NOTE: The variable eijt represents the partial elasticities of factor price. The letter j indexes the four labor inputs, capital, and tech-
nology (time). dlnXjt is the change in the log quantity of factor j between times t and t-lO. Numbers may not add due to rounding. 
change depressed the wages of more recent cohorts of 
low-skilled old workers, while having little effect on 
young low-skilled workers. The second most important 
factor was the increase in the capital stock over this 
period, which increased the wages of young workers 
relative to old workers, thus decreasing wage growth by 
about 26 percentage points. The largest countervailing 
factor was the increase in the number of other types of 
workers. Since it is easier to substitute away from 
young low-skilled workers than old low-skilled 
workers, the increase in alternative types of workers 
depressed the wages of young workers by a greater 
amount, steepening the wage profile. 
For high-skilled workers, the increase in wage 
growth was also largely due to technical change, which 
was biased in such a way as to lower the wages of 
young workers while leaving the wages of older 
workers relatively unchanged. The increase in the 
quantities of other types of workers also increased 
wage growth, by significantly increasing the wages of 
older workers who are complements with many other 
types of labor, while lowering the wages of young 
workers who are generally substitutes. The increase in 
the capital stock was the largest factor working to lower 
wage growth among high-skilled workers, by 
increasing the relative wages of young high-skilled 
workers. Although earlier research has made much of 
the depressive effect of large own-cohort size on wage 
levels, we find that the affect on wage growth was small 
compared with other factors: it marginally depressed 
the wage growth of low-skilled workers (since low-
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skilled workers were equally affected by their large 
cohort size throughout their lives) and increased the 
wage growth of high-skilled workers by 10 percentage 
points, as the depressive effects of large cohort size on 
high-skilled workers tended to dissipate over time. 
This chapter takes an important step toward 
identifying the aggregate trends behind the changes in 
wage growth that have occurred over the past 30 years. 
It also gives us some insight into how wage growth will 
change in the future. Although future advances in 
technology are difficult to predict, the demographic 
changes facing the labor market in the next several 
decades can be foretold as, barring a dramatic increase 
in immigration. the potential workforce has already 
been born. Ceteris paribus, the relatively small 
generation that succeeded the baby boom is likely to 
experience a convergence in the wage growth of high-
and low-skilled workers, while the members of the 
"baby-boom echo" will again see the wage growth rates 
of high-skilled workers outpace those of low-skilled 
workers.· The paper also provides a basis for future 
research using micro data. It would be of particular 
interest to gain an understanding of why technical 
change affects old and young workers with the same 
level of education differently. The issue of why 
technical change should be biased against high-skill 
young workers seems especially important. 
Taken together, these chapters have sought to 
document and explain the implications that recent 
economic changes have had on young workers 
11 
throughout the early years of their careers. The most 
important point is that for young workers with low 
levels of education, not only wages but also wage 
growth have declined, resulting in lower lifetime 
earnings, higher lifetime eamings inequality, and, as 
was shown in the first chapter, depressed labor market 
participation. Public policies aimed at improving 
outcomes for these young men must take into 
consideration the long-term nature of the problem. The 
chapters also make a methodological contribution by 
refining methods for using repeated cross sections of 
data and short panels to examine life-cycle issues. The 
advantages of the CPS are also inherent in a number of 
other datasets with similar structures, including the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey, the Survey of 
Consumer Finance and the Health and Retirement 
Survey. Therefore, the methodologies employed in 
these paper have a potentially great range of uses. 
NOTES 
This summary is from the author's doctoral dissertation at 
Columbia University; her advisor was Stephen Cameron. Dr. 
Aaronson is now with the Federal Reserve Board. 
1. All calculations are the author's based on the 1968-1998 
March Demographic Supplements to the Current 
Population survey (CPS), which refer to the years 1967-
1997. 
2. The source of wage growth in this model may derive from 
any number of sources, including (but not limited to) 
returns to experience, learning about the quality of a job 
march, or the back-loading for wages, as long as it is 
conditional on prior work experience. 
3. Some of this same intuition can be found in the emphical 
results of Shaw (1989) and Wolpin (1992), although the 
methodology of those papers is very different from the 
work presented here. 
4. Although there are several panel data sets which could 
have been used for much of the analysis presented here, 
the CPS has several advantages. At least 30 years of data 
are available, allowing for an exploration of the trends in 
employment over thne. Furthermore, the large sample 
sizes allow for more detailed analysis of subsamples of 
the population. The advantages of the CPS are discussed 
in greater detail in the first two chapters of the 
dissertation. 
5. Exceptions include Bernhardt, Morris, and Handcock 
(1998), Haider (1998), and Gittleman and Joyce (1996). 
A number of studies have exarnined the related issue of 
mobility, including Moffit and Gottschalk (1995) and 
Buchinsky and Hunt (1996). 
6. We choose to follow the men for 10 years because by that 
time they will have experienced most of the wage growth 
that will occur over their careers (Murphy and Welch 
1990). Choosing a longer thne period would reduce the 
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number of cohorts we observe without adding much 
information on earnings. 
7. The dissertation includes a complete discussion of the 
relative merits of using the coefficient of variation to 
measure earnings inequality. 
8. For an overview of the matched CPS, see Peracchi and 
Welch (1995). 
9. Evidence of the increase in the variance of the persistent 
component of the earnings has been presented by 
Cameron and Tracy (1998), among others. 
10. During this time there was also a dramatic increase in the 
number and proportion of women participating in the 
labor force. In this study we do not isolate the effect of 
the increase in female labor force participation, although 
we do attempt to control for the change in the 
composition of the workforce that results from their 
higher rates of participation. 
11. Another possible explanation for the change in wage 
growth is a change in cohort quality. This issue is 
discussed more fully in the dissertation. Although we do 
not account for shifts in within-group quality, we do 
attempt to account for changes in cohort quality that 
might have occurred as a result of the changing 
composition of the labor force. 
12. Low-skilled workers are all those with less than a college 
degree, while high-skilled workers have at least a college 
degree. "Young" workers are in the first five years of 
post-schooling work experience. All other workers are 
considered "old." A finer breakdown of workers was not 
possible due to data limitations. Although these are very 
broad groupings and do not correspond precisely to the 
definitions used in the earlier chapters, nonetheless, the 
same basic trends in wage growth are apparent. 
13. Previous studies, notably Heckman, Lochner, and Taber 
1998 and MaCurdy and Mroz 1995, have examined 
changes in wage growth over time, but the approaches 
differed significantly from the one pursued here and they 
did not attempt to decompose the underlying causes for 
the trends. 
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